We consider a model of game-theoretic network design initially studied by Anshelevich et al. [2] , where selfish players select paths in a network to minimize their cost, which is prescribed by Shapley cost shares. If all players are identical, the cost share incurred by a player for an edge in its path is the fixed cost of the edge divided by the number of players using it. In this special case, Anshelevich et al. [2] proved that pure-strategy Nash equilibria always exist and that the price of stability-the ratio in costs of a minimumcost Nash equilibrium and an optimal solution-is Θ(log k), where k is the number of players. Little was known about the existence of equilibria or the price of stability in the general weighted version of the game. Here, each player i has a weight wi ≥ 1, and its cost share of an edge in its path equals wi times the edge cost, divided by the total weight of the players using the edge.
INTRODUCTION

The Price of Stability in Network Design Games
Understanding the interaction between incentives and optimization in networks is an important problem that has recently been the focus of much work by the theoretical computer science community. Despite the wealth of results obtained in this area over the past five years, network design and formation remains a fundamental topic that is not well understood. While economists and social scientists have long studied game-theoretic models for how networks are or should be created with self-interested agents (see e.g. [6, 14, 15] and the references therein), the mathematical techniques for quantifying the performance of such networks are currently limited.
The goal of quantifying performance (or lack thereof) in the presence of selfish behavior naturally motivates the twin concepts of the price of anarchy and the price of stability. To define these, first recall that a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium is an assignment of all of the players of a noncooperative game to strategies so that the following stability property holds: no player can switch strategies and become better off, assuming that all other players hold their strategies fixed. As the outcome of selfish, uncoordinated behavior, Nash equilibria are typically inefficient and do not optimize natural objective functions [11] .
The price of anarchy and the price of stability are two ways to measure the inefficiency of Nash equilibria of a game, with respect to a notion of "social good" (such as the total cost incurred by all of the players). The price of anarchy of a game, first defined in Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [16] , is the ratio of the objective function value of the worst Nash equilibrium and that of an optimal solution. The price of anarchy is natural from the perspective of worst-case analysis-an upper bound on the price of anarchy bounds the inefficiency of every possible stable outcome of a game.
The price of stability, by contrast, is the ratio of the objective function value of the best Nash equilibrium and that of an optimal solution. The price of stability was first studied in Schulz and Stier Moses [25] and was so-called in Anshelevich et al. [2] . The price of stability has primarily been studied in network design games [2, 3] , with the interpretation that the network will be designed by a central authority (for use by selfish agents), but that this authority is unable or unwilling to incessantly prevent the network users to from acting selfishly after the network is built. In such a setting, the best Nash equilibrium-the best network that accounts for the incentives facing the network users-is an obvious solution to propose. In this sense, the price of stability can be regarded as the necessary degradation in the solution quality caused by imposing the game-theoretic constraint of stability.
Shapley Cost Sharing with Unweighted Players
The goal of analyzing the cost of networks created by or designed for selfish users was first proposed by Papadimitriou [21] and initially explored independently by Anshelevich et al. [3] and Fabrikant et al. [12] . These two papers studied different types of network design games; also, the first considered the price of stability (where it was called the "optimistic price of anarchy"), the second the price of anarchy. (See also [1, 10, 18] for more recent work on these and related models.) Closest to the present work is a variation on the model of [3] that was proposed and studied by Anshelevich et at. [2] , which they called network design with Shapley cost sharing and we will abbreviate to Shapley network design games.
The most basic model considered in [2] is the following. The game occurs in a directed graph G = (V, E), where each edge e has a nonnegative cost ce, and each player i is identified with a source-sink pair (si, ti). Every player i picks a path Pi from its source to its destination, thereby creating the network (V, ∪iPi) at a social cost of P e∈∪ i P i ce. This social cost is assumed to be shared among the players in the following way. First, if edge e lies in fe of the chosen paths, then each player choosing such a path pays a proportional share πe = ce/fe of the cost. The overall cost ci(P1, . . . , P k ) to player i is then the sum P e∈P i πe of these proportional shares.
Of all the ways to share the social cost among the players, this proportional sharing method enjoys numerous desirable properties. It is "budget balanced", in that it partitions the social cost among the players; it can be derived from the Shapley value, and as a consequence is the unique cost-sharing method satisfying certain fairness axioms (see e.g. [19] ); and, as shown in [2] , it coaxes benign behavior from the players. Specifically, Anshelevich et al. [2] showed that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium always exists-unlike with the more general cost-sharing that was allowed in the predecessor model [3] -and that the price of stability under Shapley cost-sharing is at most the kth harmonic number H k = O(log k), where k is the number of players. Anshele-vich et al. [2] also provided an example showing that this upper bound is the best possible, and proved numerous extensions.
Shapley Cost Sharing with Weighted Players
A natural and important extension that Anshelevich et al. [2] identified but proved few results for is that to weighted players. In most network design settings, we expect the amount of traffic to vary across source-sink pairs. Such non-uniformity could arise for many reasons. For example, each player could represent the traffic of a large population, such as the customers of an Internet Service Provider, and all such populations cannot be expected to possess a common size; players could represent individuals with different bandwidth requirements; or collusion among several players could yield a single "virtual" player with size equal to the sum of those of the colluding players.
The definition of network design with Shapley cost-sharing extends easily to include weighted players: if wi denotes the weight of player i, then i's cost share of an edge e is ce · wi/We, where We is the total weight of the players that use a path containing the edge e. But while easy to define, this weighted network design game appeared challenging to analyze. Indeed, prior to the present work, the primary results known for this weighted game were essentially suggestions that it exhibits more complex behavior than its unweighted counterpart. In particular, Anshelevich et al. [2] proved the following: that the key "potential function" proof technique for the unweighted case cannot be directly used for games with weighted players; and that the price of stability can be as large as Ω(k + log W ), where k is the number of players and W = P i wi is the sum of the players' weights (assuming wi ≥ 1 for all i). The positive results of [2] for weighted games concerned only the special cases of 2-player games and of single-commodity games (where all players have both the same source and the same sink). No further positive or negative results on either the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria or on the price of stability were known for weighted Shapley network design games.
Our Results
In this paper, we give the first general results for weighted Shapley network design games. We set the stage for our work in Section 3 by exhibiting such a game with no purestrategy Nash equilibrium. This example has only three players, employs a single-sink undirected network, and the ratio between the maximum and minimum player weights can be made arbitrarily small. (Pure-strategy Nash equilibria are known to exist in all weighted Shapley network design games with two players [2] .) Thus there are no large classes of weighted Shapley network design games that always possess pure-strategy Nash equilibria beyond those identified in [2] .
Our example motivates considering a larger class of equilibria to recover a guarantee that equilibria exist. Once existence has been established, we can then attempt to bound the price of stability with respect to this larger set of equilibria. There are several possible approaches to accomplishing this goal, and we compare these at length in the next subsection. In this paper, we pursue the same line of inquiry as in Anshelevich et al. [3] -where for a different but related network design game, pure-strategy Nash equilibria did not necessarily exist-and consider approximate pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We say that an outcome is an α-approximate Nash equilibrium if no player can decrease its cost by more than an α multiplicative factor by deviating. The obvious goal is then to prove that α-approximate Nash equilibria always exist and that some such equilibrium has cost within a β factor of optimal, where α and β are as small as possible. Since these two parameters work against each other, we seek to more generally understand the interaction between the best-possible values of α and β. How much stability must we give up in order to achieve a lowcost solution, and vice versa? Is it possible to take one or both of α, β to be an absolute constant?
Our main results give a complete solution to these questions. To describe them, scale players' weights so that the minimum player weight is 1, and let wmax and W denote the maximum weight and the sum of all weights, respectively. On the positive side, we show that every weighted Shapley network design game admits an O(log wmax)-approximate Nash equilibrium, and that the price of stability with respect to such equilibria is O(log W ). More generally, we prove the following trade-off between the two objectives: for every α = Ω(log wmax), the price of stability with respect to O(α)-approximate Nash equilibria is O((log W )/α). Thus to implement a network with cost within a constant factor of the optimal solution, it suffices to relax the equilibrium constraints by a logarithmic (in W ) factor. This is a new result even for unweighted Shapley network design games. (Recall that in unweighted games, it is impossible to approximate the cost to within an o(log k) factor without relaxing the equilibrium constraints [2] .)
On the negative side, we demonstrate that this trade-off curve is very close to the best possible. In our most involved construction, we exhibit a family of weighted Shapley network design games without o(log wmax/ log log wmax)-approximate Nash equilibria. Recovering the existence of equilibria therefore requires relaxing the equilibrium constraints by a super-constant (though only logarithmic) factor. We also show that for every α = Ω(log wmax/ log log wmax), a price of stability of O((log W )/α) can only be obtained by relaxing the equilibrium constraints by an Ω(α) factor.
Discussion of Alternative Approaches
We conclude the Introduction by justifying our decision to focus on α-approximate pure-strategy Nash equilibria and by discussing three alternative ways of relaxing the problem.
First, we could ignore the non-existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria and prove bounds on the price of stability for instances in which such equilibria do exist. This approach has recently been successively applied to bounding the price of anarchy in weighted unsplittable selfish routing games [5, 9] , which do not always possess pure-strategy Nash equilibria [13, 23] . Unfortunately, for weighted Shapley network design games, a consequence of our constructions is that no sublinear bound on the price of stability is possible in the parameter range where pure-strategy Nash equilibria need not exist. Precisely, we will show in the full version of the paper that for every function f (x) = o(log x/ log log x), there is a family of weighted Shapley network design games in which f (wmax)-approximate Nash equilibria exist, but all such equilibria have cost an Ω(W ) factor times that of optimal.
Second, we could study the recent notion of "sink equilibria" due to Goemans, Mirrokni, and Vetta [13] . A sink equilibrium of a game is a strongly connected component with no outgoing arcs in the best-response graph of the game (where nodes correspond to outcomes, arcs to bestresponse deviations by players). Note that once a sequence of best-response deviations leads to a sink equilibrium, it will never again escape it. Sink equilibria always exist, although they can be extremely large (such as the entire best-response graph). The social value (or cost) of a sink equilibrium is defined in [13] as the expected value of a random state, where the expectation is over the stationary distribution of a random walk in the directed graph corresponding to the equilibrium. While sink equilibria are a well-motivated concept and make analyses of the price of anarchy more robust and realistic (and this was the motivation in [13] ), it is not clear that they are relevant to price of stability analyses, where we envision a single solution being proposed to players as a low-cost, stable outcome. Note in particular that a sink equilibrium offers no guarantee to an individual player except for a trivial one: if a node is reached via a best-response deviation by that player, then of course it will not want to deviate again. Unfortunately, this is small consolation to a player that spends most of its time in undesirable states while other players take their turns performing their own best-response deviations.
Third, and perhaps most obviously, we could study mixedstrategy Nash equilibria, where each player can randomize over its path set to minimize its expected cost. Every weighted Shapley network design game admits at least one mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium by Nash's Theorem [20] . As with sink equilibria, however, it is not clear how to interpret mixed-strategy equilibria in the context of the price of stability of network design (see also the discussion in [3] ). For example, a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium could potentially randomize only over outcomes that are not α-approximate Nash equilibria for any reasonable value of α, leading only to realizations that would be extremely difficult to enforce. One possible solution would be to implement some type of contract binding the players to the realization of a mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium. Once enforceable contracts are assumed, however, it is arguably more realistic to simply build a near-optimal network and appropriately transfer payments from players incurring small cost to those incurring large cost. Finally, if one insists on making assumptions that cause mixed-strategy Nash equilibria to be realistically implementable, then we advocate correlated equilibria [4] as a more suitable candidate for price of stability analyses. Correlated equilibria are no harder to justify than mixedstrategy Nash equilibria for the price of stability of network design. Moreover, since they form a convex set containing all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, they seem likely to be both more powerful and more analytically tractable. We note that the inefficiency of correlated equilibria in different applications has largely resisted analysis so far (though see [8] ), and leave this direction open for future research.
THE MODEL
We now briefly formalize the model of network design with selfish players that we outlined in the Introduction. A weighted Shapley network design game is a directed graph G = (V, E) with k source-sink pairs (s1, t1), . . . , (s k , t k ), where each pair (si, ti) is associated with a player i that has a positive weight wi. By scaling, we can assume that mini wi = 1. Finally, each edge e has a nonnegative cost ce.
The strategies for player i are the simple si-ti paths Pi in G. An outcome of the game is a vector (P1, . . . , P k ) of paths with Pi ∈ Pi for each i. For a given outcome and a player i, the cost share π i e of an edge e ∈ Pi is ce · wi/We, where We = P j : e∈P j wj is the total weight of the players that select a path containing e. The cost to player i in an outcome is the sum of its cost shares: ci(P1, . . . , P k ) = P e∈P i π i e . An outcome (P1, . . . , P k ) is a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium if, for each i, Pi minimizes ci over all paths in Pi while keeping Pj fixed for j = i. An outcome (P1, . . . , P k ) is an α-approximate Nash equilibrium if for each i,
The cost C(P1, . . . , P k ) of an outcome (P1, . . . , P k ) is defined as
The price of stability of a game that has at least one Nash equilibrium is C(N )/C(O), where N is a Nash equilibrium of minimum-possible cost and O is an outcome of minimum-possible cost. The price of stability of αapproximate Nash equilibria is defined analogously. Finally, we will sometime use the expression (α, β)-approximate Nash equilibrium to mean an outcome that is an α-approximate Nash equilibrium and that has cost at most a β factor times that of optimal.
NON-EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIB-RIA WITH WEIGHTED PLAYERS
In this section, we prove that weighted Shapley network design games need not possess a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1
There is a 3-player weighted Shapley network design game that admits no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the underlying network is undirected with a single sink, and the ratio between the maximum and minimum player weights can be made arbitrarily small.
Recall that Anshelevich et al. [2] proved that every twoplayer weighted Shapley network design game has a purestrategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.1:
We first present a directed network with no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and then describe how to convert it into an undirected example. The directed version is shown in Figure 1 . Let G denote this graph and w > 1 a parameter. The players with sources s1, s2, and s3 have weights w 2 , 1, and w, respectively. All three players share a common sink t. Costs for the edges of G are defined as in Table 1 , where we assume that > 0 is much smaller than 1/w 3 .
Let ci denote the cost of edge ei. Our argument will rely on the following two chains of inequalities, which follow from our choice of edge costs:
and
(For the reader who wishes to verify these, we suggest initially taking w = 2.) Now suppose for contradiction that a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium exists in G. Suppose further than the second player uses the path e2 → e5 → e9 in this equilibrium. The first half of the inequality (2) implies that the third player must be using the one-hop path e8 (it would share edge e6 with no other player, and in the best case would share edge e9 with both of the other players). The first half of inequality (1) then implies that the first player must use the one-hop path e7. But then the second player would prefer the path e3 → e6 → e9, contradicting our initial assumption.
Similarly, if the second player uses the path e3 → e6 → e9 in a Nash equilibrium, then the second half of inequality (2) implies that the third player must be using the path e4 → e6 → e9. The second half of inequality (1) then implies that the first player must use e1 → e5 → e9. Since this would cause the path e2 → e5 → e9 to be preferable to the second player, we again arrive at a contradiction. There is thus no Nash equilibrium in this weighted Shapley network design game.
To convert this directed example into an undirected one, simply make all of the edges undirected and add a large constant M >> w 3 to the costs of the edges e1, e2, e3, e4, e7, and e8. The cost of every path in the original directed network increases by exactly M ; the cost of new paths are at least 2M . As long as M is sufficiently large, no player will use one of the new undirected paths in an equilibrium, and all of the arguments for the directed network carry over without change.
LOW-COST APPROXIMATE NASH EQUILIBRIA: LOWER BOUNDS
In this section we present negative results on the existence and price of stability of α-approximate Nash equilibria in weighted Shapley network design games. We state our lower bound on the feasible trade-offs between cost and stability in Subsection 4.1. The technical heart of this lower bound is Subsection 4.3, where we construct weighted Shapley net- work design games without o(log wmax/ log log wmax)-approximate Nash equilibria. We illustrate a simpler version of this construction in Subsection 4.2, which is enough to rule out the existence of (2 − )-approximate Nash equilibria for arbitrarily small > 0. We will give nearly matching positive results in Section 5.
Lower Bounds for Trading Stability for Cost
The goal of this section is to establish the following lower bound on the feasible trade-offs between the stability and the cost of approximate Nash equilibria: for every α = Ω(log wmax/ log log wmax), a price of stability of O((log W )/α) can be achieved only by relaxing equilibrium constraints by an Ω(α) factor. Precisely, we will prove the following. Theorem 4.1 Let f and g be two bivariate real-valued functions, increasing in each argument, such that every weighted Shapley network design game with maximum player weight wmax and sum of player weights W admits an f (wmax, W )approximate Nash equilibrium with cost no more than a (1 + g(wmax, W )) factor times that of optimal. Then:
As we will see in the next section, Theorem 4.1 is optimal up to a doubly logarithmic factor in part (a).
Networks Without (2− )-Approximate Nash Equilibria
We now work toward Theorem 4.1 by giving networks without α-approximate Nash equilibria for α arbitrarily close to 2. We first describe the network, then give the intuition behind the construction, and then give the details.
We will consider the network shown in Figure 2 . In the figure, all sources and sinks have only one incident arc, except for s * ands * , which each has one incoming and one outgoing arc. There are two primary paths, denoted Q and Q, which contain all of the edges on the lower and upper horizontal paths, respectively.
There will be several parameters. We assume that we are given an arbitrarily small positive number 0 ≤ 0.1, with the goal of exhibiting a network with no (2 − 0)-approximate Nash equilibria. We then set p = 8/ 0, = 0/8, i = log 1+ (32p) + 2, and n = p i+1 . We next discuss the edge costs. To minimize subscripts, in this subsection and the next we will use c(e) to denote the cost of an edge e. Edges not on either primary path have cost 0. The edge costs on the primary paths are as follows:
• c(ei) = c(ēi) = p i 2 ;
• c(ej) = c(ēj ) = p i 8 (1+ ) i−j−1 , for all j = 1, 2, . . . , i−1; • c(e0,j ) = c(ē0,j ) = 1, for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
The remaining edges on the primary paths have cost 0, as in Figure 2 . The players are as follows.
• Players Ai, A * , andĀ * (with corresponding sourcesink pairs (si, ti), (s * , t * ), and (s * ,t * )) have weight p i .
• For each j = 1, 2, . . . , i − 1, there is a player Aj with weight p j and source-sink pair (sj, tj).
• There are n small players A0,1, A0,2, . . . , A0,n, each with weight 1. For every j, the small player A0,j has source s0,j and sink t0.
We can then prove the following. In the proof of Theorem 4.2 we will formalize the following ideas. First, player Ai must choose one of the primary paths, which in turn makes the edges on this path look cheap to the other players. Second, whichever primary path Ai chooses, its decision must cascade through the rest of the players. Third, the n small players then wrap around to the other primary path, which in turn causes player Ai to want to switch to the other primary path, thereby precluding any stable outcome. We now make this proof approach rigorous.
Proof. We start with some terminology. A short path of a player that is not small is a path that leaves the player's source with a hop to one of the primary paths, follows that primary path, and then ends with a final hop to the player's destination. A long path of a player that is not small is one that contains edges of both primary paths. Note that for every player that is not small, all of its paths are either short or long; all such players have precisely two short paths, except for players A * andĀ * , who each have one.
For the proof of theorem, we will prove the following five statements in turn.
(1) In every (2 − 0)-approximate Nash equilibrium, no small player uses a path containing ej orēj with j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i − 1}. (2) In every (2− 0 )-approximate Nash equilibrium, player Ai uses a short path.
(3) In every (2− 0)-approximate Nash equilibrium in which player Ai uses its lower (upper) short path, the players A1, . . . , Ai−1 also use their lower (upper) short paths.
(4) In every (2− 0)-approximate Nash equilibrium in which player Ai uses its lower (upper) short path, all of the small players use paths that include the edgeēi (ei).
(5) In every (2− 0)-approximate Nash equilibrium in which all of the small players use paths that include the edgeēi (ei), player Ai uses its upper (lower) short path.
Since (4) and (5) are mutually exclusive, proving (1)-(5) completes the proof of the theorem.
Before proving these statements, note that the only (simple) path available to each of A * andĀ * is its short path; hence these two players use the edges ei andēi but no other edges on the primary paths.
For (1), first note that if a small player uses an edge ej orēj for some j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i − 1}, then it also uses either e1 orē1. We therefore need only prove (1) for j = 1. Fix a small player A 0,h . If this player uses a short path (a path that uses only one edge from each primary path), it incurs a cost of at most
since while it might pay for the entire (unit) cost of the edge e 0,h orē 0,h , it shares the edge ei orēi with a player of weight p i (A * orĀ * , respectively). Suppose that player A 0,h instead uses a path that contains e1 orē1. Then the cost incurred by the player is at least the cost of this edge divided by the sum W of all of the player weights (recall that a small player has unit weight). Our parameter choices ensure that this edge's cost is at least 4p i+1 , while W = p i+1 +3p i +
the cost incurred by the player on this path is at least 4 − 16 p = 4 − 2 0 . This is strictly greater than (2 − 0) · 3 2 , which establishes (1) .
For (2), suppose first that player Ai uses a long path. Such a path must include edge e1 orē1. By part (1), the total weight of the players using this edge is at most p i + p i−1 + · · · + p. Hence the cost incurred by player Ai on such a path is at least
which is at least 2p i+1 since we have chosen p sufficiently large. On the other hand, if Ai chooses a short path, its cost is less than 3 4 p i < 2p i+1 /(2 − 0). Assertion (3) requires the most involved argument. Suppose Ai uses its lower short path (the argument for the other case is symmetric). First consider player Ai−1. If it uses its lower short path, then it shares the first edge (ei−1) with player Ai and hence incurs cost at most
If player Ai−1 uses any other path, it must in particular use the edgesēi−1 andēi−2. Moreover, parts (1) and (2) imply that the only other players that could be using these edges are Ai−2, . . . , A1. The cost incurred by Ai−1 on such a path is therefore at least
Since
player Ai−1 will choose its lower short path in every (2− 0)approximate Nash equilibrium in which player Ai chooses its lower short path. The above argument then applies inductively to players Ai−2, . . . , A2. For a generic player j, its cost on its lower short path (given that Aj+1 uses its lower short path) is at most
while its cost on every other path (given that players Ai−1, . . ., Aj+1 use their lower short paths) is at least
As above, this implies that Aj will use its lower short path. Finally, for player A1, the cost of its lower short path (given that A2 uses its lower short path) is at most
Every other s1-t1 path contains the edgeē1 which, as a consequence of the previous steps, is otherwise unoccupied. Hence, every other s1-t1 path has cost at least 4p i+1 . Since we have chosen p sufficiently large, this is strictly greater than (2 − 0)(p i+1 + 4p i (1 + )), and hence A1 will use its lower short path, completing the proof of (3).
For (4), first consider the small player A0,1. Since parts (1)-(3) imply that edgeē0,1 is unoccupied except possibly for A0,1, the player will incur a cost of 1 for using a path that includes this edge. On the other hand, if the player uses its lower short path (the path containing only e0,1,ēi, and zerocost edges), it shares edge e0,1 with player A1 and therefore incurs cost at most "
Since ( 1 2 + 1 1+(8/ 0 ) )(2 − 0) < 1, player A0,1 will not take a path that includes the edgeē0,1, and must therefore take a path that includes e0,1 and wraps around to include the edgeēi. Applying this same argument inductively to the players A0,2, . . . , A0,n then proves (4) .
Finally, to show (5), consider a (2 − 0)-approximate Nash equilibrium in which all of the small players choose paths that include the edgeēi (as usual, the other case is symmetric). If player Ai is using its lower short path, then parts (1)-(4) imply that it shares edge ei only with player A * , and therefore its cost share for this edge is p i /4. On the other hand, if Ai uses its upper short path, it shares edgeēi with all p i+1 of the small players, and therefore its cost on this path is at most
Since 0 = 8/p,
and hence Ai must use its upper short path. This completes the proof of (5) and of the theorem.
Networks Without o(log wmax/ log log wmax)-Approximate Nash Equilibria
We next build on the construction in Theorem 4.2 to show a much stronger (and near-optimal) lower bound on the existence of approximate Nash equilibria. Due to space constraints, we only describe some of the intuition behind Theorem 4.3 and defer all of the details to the full version. The high-level idea is similar to the previous construction, with an upper and lower primary path that wrap around and cross over at their ends. As before, only edges on the primary paths have nonzero cost and most players can choose between short paths on the upper and lower primary paths.
The source of amplification in the new construction is that, instead of having one player with weight p i for each i as in the previous example, we will use √ p players with weight p 2i for each i. For each stage, there will be √ p edges on each of the main paths instead of just one. The structure of the argument that there is no α-approximate Nash equilibrium then consists of verifying the analogous statements (1)- (5) . While the proof is complicated by the larger value of α and the increased number of players and paths, it is conceptually very similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2. The details can be found in the full version.
With Theorem 4.3 in hand, we can easily finish the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: Part (a) follows immediately from Theorem 4.3. Part (b) holds even for the special case of unweighted Shapley network design games and follows from a minor modification of an example in [2] . Specifically, Anshelevich et al. [2] presented an unweighted Shapley network design game in which a minimum-cost solution has cost 1 and the unique Nash equilibrium has cost H k . Moreover, the two outcomes use disjoint edge sets. For each fixed value of W , we take this example with k = W players and scale down the costs of the edges used by the Nash equilibrium by a f (1, W ) + factor. This yields an (unweighted) game in which the only f (1, W )-approximate Nash equilibrium has cost Ω(log W/f(1, W )) (and the minimum-cost solution still has value 1). Thus f (1, W ) · g(1, W ) = Ω(log W ) for all W ≥ 1.
LOW-COST APPROXIMATE NASH EQUILIBRIA: UPPER BOUNDS
In this section we prove our main positive result, that every weighted Shapley network design game admits an approximate Nash equilibrium with low cost. Specifically, we show that for all α = Ω(log wmax), every such game admits an O(α)-approximate Nash equilibrium with cost an O((log W )/α) times that of optimal. (Recall that wmax and W denote the maximum player weight and the sum of the players' weights, respectively.) In particular, every weighted Shapley network design game possesses an O(log W )-approximate Nash equilibrium with cost at most a constant times that of optimal. This is a new result even for unweighted Shapley network design games.
At a high level, our proof is based on the "potential function method" that has been previously used to bound the price of anarchy and stability in a number of different games (see [24] ). A real-valued function Φ defined on the outcomes of a game is a potential function if, for every player i and every possible deviation by that player, the change in the value of Φ equals the change in player i's objective function. Thus a potential function "tracks" successive deviations by players. In particular, local optima of a potential function are precisely the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. Potential functions were originally applied in noncooperative game theory by Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten [7] , Rosenthal [22] , and Monderer and Shapley [17] , in successively more general settings, to prove the existence of Nash equilibria. Potential functions can also be used to bound the price of stability: if a game has a potential function Φ that is always close to the true social cost, then a global optimum of Φ, or any local optimum reachable from the min-cost outcome via best-response deviations, has cost close to optimal. Indeed, Anshelevich et al. [2] proved both the existence of Nash equilibria and an H k upper bound on the price of stability in unweighted Shapley network design games using a potential function.
Proposition 3.1 implies that weighted Shapley network design games do not generally admit a potential function (see also [2] ). We nonetheless show that ideas from potential functions can be used to derive an nearly optimal stability vs. cost trade-off for approximate Nash equilibria of weighted Shapley network design games. The initial idea is simple: we identify an "approximate potential function", which decreases whenever a player deviates and decreases its cost by a sufficiently large factor. This argument will imply the existence of an O(log wmax)-approximate Nash equilibrium with cost within an O(log W ) factor of optimal in every weighted Shapley network design game.
Extending this argument to obtain a stability vs. cost trade-off requires further work. The reason is that we will use a common approximate potential function for all points on the trade-off curve, and this potential function can overestimate the true cost by as much as a Θ(log W ) factor. On the surface, this function therefore seems incapable of proving an o(log W ) bound on cost, even if we relax equilibrium constraints by a large factor. We overcome this problem by more carefully considering how extra cost is incurred throughout best-response dynamics starting from a minimum-cost outcome. Specifically, we show that as we increase the relaxation factor on the equilibrium constraints, the allowable best-response deviations lead to more rapid decreases in the value of our approximate potential function. Roughly, this allows us to prove that every sequence of such deviations ends sufficiently quickly, without accruing much additional cost. Precisely, we use these ideas to prove the following result (cf., Theorem 4.1). 
Then every weighted Shapley network design game with maximum player weight wmax and sum of player weights W admits an f (wmax, W )-approximate Nash equilibrium with cost at most (1 + g(wmax, W )) times that of optimal.
Before proving the theorem, we first establish some preliminary results. y) ] · y x+y . Proof. For both parts, we will use the fact that (1 + 1
x ) x approaches e monotonically from below as x → ∞. For part (a), first note that if x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 1 + x, then the inequality holds: the right-hand side is at most 1 while the left-hand side equals log 2 (1 + y 1+x ) ≥ 1. So suppose that y < 1 + x; then
Raising both sides of this inequality to the y/(x + y) power and then taking the logarithm (base 2) of both sides verifies the claim.
For part (b), we have
As before, raising both sides of this inequality to the y/(x + y) power and then taking the logarithm (base 2) of both sides verifies the claimed inequality.
We next consider the existence of approximate Nash equilibria without worrying about their cost. Recall that wmax and W denote the maximum player weight and the sum of the player weights of a weighted Shapley network design game, respectively, after weights have been scaled so that the minimum player weight is 1. Proof. We define an approximate potential function Φ for a weighted Shapley network design game as follows: for an outcome (P1, . . . , P k ) of the game, define Φ(P1, . . . , P k ) = X e∈E ce log 2 (1 + We),
where We = P j : e∈P j wj . Call a deviation by a player from one outcome to another α-improving if the deviation decreases the cost incurred by the player by at least an α multiplicative factor. Thus α-approximate Nash equilibria are those outcomes from which no α-improving deviations exist. To prove the lemma, it suffices to show that f (wmax, W )improving deviations strictly decrease the approximate potential function Φ.
Consider an α-improving deviation of player i from the outcome (P1, . . . , P k ), say to the path Qi, where α equals f (wmax, W ). We will assume that Pi and Qi are disjoint; if this is not the case, the following argument can be applied to Pi \Qi and Qi \Pi instead. By the definition of α-improving, we have X
where We = P j : e∈P j wj denotes the total weight on edge e before player i's deviation.
We can then derive the following: 
≤ 0.
In this derivation, the equality (4) follows from the definition of Φ; the inequality (5) follows from Fact 5.2, with Fact 5.2(b) applied to each term in the first sum with x = We and y = wi, and Fact 5.2(a) applied to each term in the second sum with x = We − wi and y = wi; and the final inequality (6) follows from (3) and our choice of α.
We now extend the argument in the proof of Lemma 5.3 to account for the cost of approximate equilibria, which proves Theorem 5.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1: Consider a maximal sequence of f (wmax, W )-improving deviations that begins in a minimumcost outcome with cost C * . By Lemma 5.3, this sequence is finite and terminates at a f (wmax, W )-approximate Nash equilibrium. Consider a deviation in this sequence by a player i from a path Pi to a path Qi, and let A denote the cost of the edges of Qi that were previously vacant (i.e., used by no player). We then have ∆Φ ≤ − 
≤ − 1 2
where inequality (7) is the same as inequality (6) in the proof of Lemma 5.3; inequality (8) follows from the choice of the function f ; and inequality (9) follows from the fact that the cost incurred by player i before its deviation is at least f (wmax, W ) times the cost it incurs after the deviation, which is at least the sum A of the costs of the previously vacant edges. Hence, in the maximal sequence of f (wmax, W )-improving deviations, whenever the social cost increases by an additive factor of A, the potential function Φ decreases by at least 1 2 f (wmax, W ) · A. The potential function value of the social optimum is at most a log 2 (1 + W ) multiplicative factor larger than its cost C * , and the potential function only decreases throughout the sequence of deviations. The social cost can therefore only increase by a 2C * log 2 (1 + W )/f (wmax, W ) additive factor throughout the entire sequence of deviations. The sequence must therefore terminate in a`f (wmax, W ), 1 + (2 log 2 (1 + W ))/f (wmax, W )´approximate Nash equilibrium. Remark 5.4 Our proof of Theorem 5.1 is quite flexible and carries over to many of the extensions known for the unweighted case [2] . For example, Theorem 5.1 continues to hold for congestion games (where the strategy set of a player is an arbitrary collection of subsets of a ground set) and for concave (instead of constant) edge costs. We defer further details to the full version.
